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Abstract: This paper explores the dilemma of choosing talent using NBA data 
from 1987-2003. We find that there is much uncertainty in selecting talent. If superstars 
are found they are usually identified early, however, more false positive exist than 
correct decisions with high draft picks.  Our results suggest that the dilemma of choosing 
talent is not so much a winner’s curse but more like a purchase of a lottery ticket.  Most 
times you lose but if you are going to win you must buy one.  2
  
Introduction 
Economics has a long history of situations where agents have expost regrets 
from decisions made under uncertainty.  In the now classic case of the winner’s 
curse agents who have differing beliefs about an amenity value will find that in an 
auction the winner of the auction will be the bidder that overvalued that amenity. 
Capen, Clap and Cambell (1971) provide one of the first references to the winners 
curse looking at competitive bidding for oil leases, while Cassing and Douglas 
(1980) provides an example of the winner’s curse in baseball free agency.  More 
recently Lazear (2004) identifies the Peter Principle as a situation where individuals 
who are promoted may have been lucky in a stochastic sense and be promoted 
above their performance level. 
Nowhere is the problem more pronounced than in the pursuit of talent. 
Sports teams are in pursuit of the next Michael Jordan, movie studios in pursuit of 
the next Titanic, and music producers the next Beatles.  Yet player after player, 
movie after movie, and singer after singer fall short and fail to meet expectations.  
In the pursuit of superstars there are many false positives.  We identify this problem 
as the dilemma of choosing talent.  In section one; we model the dilemma of 
choosing talent when the distribution of talent is known to be from the upper 
portion of a talent distribution.  In section two we test the theory using a panel study 
of players in the NBA from 1987-2003.  We conclude with a discussion of the 
dilemma of choosing talent and how it relates to the economics of superstars.  
Section 1: The Model 
To formally model the problem of choosing talent consider what happens to 
the probability of finding high quality talent when the lower bound for high quality 
increases. Assume   3
• x = talent, xL < x < xH 
• x ~ continuously with a p.d.f of f(x) & a c.d.f of F(x) 
• x* is the minimum level for high quality talent 
• A potential employer observes a binary signal which is either favorable or unfavorable  
• P = prob(x > x*|favorable) 
 
Thus, from Bayes theorem we have: 
 P  = 
*) x x ( prob *) x x | favorable ( prob *) x x ( prob *) x x | favorable ( prob
*) x x ( prob *) x x | favorable ( prob
< < + > >
> >
  .    (1) 
 
Note prob(x > x*) = 1-F(x*) and prob(x<x*) = F(x*).  
  Now suppose the probability of a favorable signals increases linearly in x: 
prob(favorable|x) = x/xH. This means those with x = xH have a probability of one of 
receiving a favorable signal; others have a smaller probability of a favorable signal.  









x *) x ( F / dx ) x ( f .  We then can simplify eq.(1): 
 







dx ) x ( xf / dx ) x ( xf .                                                                                    (1’) 
 
  The denominator of (1’) is the population mean of x, X.Clearly ∂P/∂x* is 
negative: the higher the level of talent desired (dx* > 0), the smaller the probability 
someone with a favorable signal exceeds the cut off for high talent (x*). Also ∂P/∂X is   4
negative: the more talented the population, on average, the smaller the probability 
someone with a favorable signal exceeds the cut off for high talent.  
  Note: these results do not depend on a “thin tail” at the upper end of the ability 
distribution; all we have specified is the distribution is continuous. For further insight, 
suppose x ~ uniformly on  
[X-∆,X+∆]. We have: 
 







                                                                                              (1”) 
 
 Now  ∂P/∂∆ < 0, so a larger variance of x (which is positively related to ∆) implies 
a smaller probability someone with a favorable signal exceeds the cut off for high talent.  
 Suppose  X = 6 & ∆ = 5. A firm that desired an above-average worker (x* = 6) 
would, choosing at random, obtain such a worker with a 50% probability. Using (1”), the 
signal would correctly identify such an individual 71% of the time. If the firm desired 
someone with x > 10, choosing at random, it would obtain such an individual 10% of the 
time. Using the signal, it would obtain such an individual 17.5% of the time. 
Section 2: Empirical Results 
  To empirically test the model of the dilemma of choosing talent we focus on NBA 
data of performance from the 1987-88 season to the 2003-04 season.  We use a measure 
of player performance called the efficiency formula to develop a distribution of talent. As 
reported by NBA.com, this index is calculated per game as: (points + rebounds + assists 
+ steals + blocks) – ((field goals attempted – field goals made) + (free throws attempted - 
free throws made) + turnovers)).  This measure provides a measure of quality that is 
based upon performance in all aspects of the games.  In table 1, we report the mean,   5
median, standard deviation and highest level of the efficiency rating.  We find that in all 
cases the mean is higher than the median suggesting a skewed right distribution of talent.  
We also find that the highest value is always over three standard deviations from the 
mean.  In figure one we plot a distribution of efficiency ratios for the 2001-02 season.  
The distribution is skewed right with only a few players in the top tail of the distribution. 
  In table 2, we focus on the players whose efficiency rating is two standard 
deviations from the mean.  We find that from 12 to 22 players a year have efficiency 
ratings over two standard deviations from the mean in any given year.  During this time 
period, we find that only two players who were in this elite category were undrafted, Ben 
Wallace in 2001-02 season and Brad Miller in the 2003-04 season.  Many were on the list 
a multiple of times, some as many as 9 years.  During this time, we find that many of the 
number one picks and lottery picks are in the elite category.  Some number one picks, 
however, never show up on the list.  Still others only make the list one time in their 
career. 
  In table 3, we look at only the top 5 players in efficiency ratings.  We find that in 
our 17 year panel only 19 players fill the 85 spots in this time period.  Most were on the 
list a multiple of times.  The lowest rank in the draft on this list was the 13
th pick—two 
players, Karl Malone in 1985 and Kobe Bryant in 1996.   Many of the top players were 
number one draft picks.  Many number one picks, however, did not make the top 5 
players in the NBA.  In fact many of the top picks did not make it to two deviations 
above the mean.  There are many false positives.   
  In Table 4 the mean, standard deviation, minimum value, maximum value and 
number of observations for efficiency are reported by draft number. The figures in this 
table reveal some interesting results.  First the drop off in efficiency between the first   6
pick in the draft and the second pick is statistically significant.
1 The decrease in mean 
efficiency is also statistically significant between the fifth and sixth picks.  There is a 
general negative relationship between mean efficiency and draft number; exceptions to 
this trend occur when lower picked players overachieve (e.g. Both Karl Malone and Kobe 
Bryant were thirteenth picks in the draft). Overall the draft appears to represent either an 
efficient judge of talent or a self-fulfilling prophesy (teams may give number one picks 
more minutes and more opportunities to be a superstar).  
  In table 5, we summarize the dilemma of choosing talent by calculating the 
percentage of players who obtain superstar status by draft number.  Column one 
calculates the percentage of players who have at least one season of performance two 
standard deviations above the mean.  We find that 80 percent of number one draft picks 
have at least one superstar season where their performance is two standard deviations 
above the mean.  This percentage falls of quickly with number two draft picks with only 
forty percent and number 3 draft picks having thirty percent.  Column two reports the 
percentage of players by draft pick who make the top five players in the league.  Here we 
find that the dilemma of choosing talent is great where only 35 percent of number one 
draft picks perform at this level and this falls of even more quickly.  Finding superstars is 
a rare event indeed. 
  To further test the dilemma of choosing talent, we use a random effects panel 
model to estimate player’s efficiency ratings. A simple equation to represent the model is: 
it i it it t X X Eff ε β β α + + + = − 1 2 2 1 1         ( 2 )  
where i refers to the individual player, Effii represents the efficiency of the player in year 
t,  1 X  is a vector of time-invariant player characteristics,  ) 1 ( 2 − t X is a vector of experience 
measures and  t ε  is vector of disturbances. The only time variant player characteristics 
                                                 
1 The value of the test statistic is 6.5239. This is greater than the critical value at the .005 level of 
significance given the degrees of freedom.   7
included in the model are experience and experience squared; no performance statistics 
are used since efficiency is computed from these stats. Time invariant personal 
characteristics used to explain efficiency are player height, weight, years of college and a 
dummy variable equal to one for white players.  
Two options for estimating this model are the fixed effects approach and the 
random effects approach. In the fixed effects formulation of the model differences across 
individuals are captured in differences in the constant term; thus any time-invariant 
personal characteristics are dropped from the regression.  In this formulation of the model 
it is impossible to determine if differences exist between players in terms of efficiency 
due to draft number or other time-invariant variables. Therefore the fixed effects model 
will not be used.  
In the random effects formulation the differences between individuals is modeled 
as parametric shifts of the regression function. This technique of estimating panel data 
allows for estimates of all of the time-invariant personal characteristics as well as the 
experience statistics. Breusch and Pagan (1980) developed a Lagrange multiplier test 
(LM Test) for the appropriateness of the random effects model compared to the OLS 
format.
2 The Lagrange Multiplier test statistic is 9481.09, which greatly exceeds the 95 
percent chi-squared with one degree of freedom, 3.84. Thus the simply OLS regression 
model with a single constant term is inappropriate. 
 In table 6 we report these results.  In regression I, draft number, experience, 
experience squared, years of college and race are all statistically significant determinants 
of efficiency; height and weight are not.  As expected, efficiency declines as draft number 
rises. Efficiency initially rises with experience then declines. Efficiency declines as years 
of college rises; this reflects the early entry of outstanding college or high school players.  
                                                 
2 See Stata Release 6 , Reference SU-Z pp. 438-439 for details or Greene (2000) , pp. 572-573.   8
The negative coefficient for white players is interesting. A priori we would expect this 
coefficient to equal zero.  The results suggest that white players may be drafted higher 
than the future performance would indicate.   Regression II is run minus the white 
variable.  There is no change in sign or significance of the remaining variables.  
The R-square of the models is around 16%-17% overall.  It is somewhat higher in 
explaining variation in efficiency between players, approximately 22 %, and between 
years for the same players, 23%. In general the results suggest a great deal of unexplained 
variation in player efficiency from season to season.  
Conclusions 
The dilemma of choosing talent suggests that when talent is thin more false 
positive signals exist than correct decisions.  Using NBA data we find that there is much 
uncertainty in selecting talent.   Our results also show that if superstars are found they are 
usually identified early, however, more false positive exist than correct decisions with 
high draft picks.  Our results suggest that the dilemma of choosing talent is not so much a 
winner’s curse but more like a purchase of a lottery ticket.  Most times you lose but if 
you are going to win you must buy one.  
   9
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Draft Year and Draft Number of Players whose performance was two 
Standard deviations above the mean based on efficiency measure 
 
1987-1988 
84-3, 78-6, 84-5, 84-1, 83-14, 79-1, 85-13, 84-16, 80-3, 82-11 
 
1988-1989 
84-3, 79-1, 84-5, 84-1, 85-13, 83-14, 82-11, 85-1, 84-16, 87-7, 78-6,  85-7    
 
1989-1990 
84-3, 84-1, 85-1, 85-13, 84-5, 87-1, 79-1, 78-6, 84-16, 87-7, 85-7, 83-14, 82-11, 81-8 
 
1990-1991 
87-1, 84-3, 85-13, 84-5, 84-1, 85-1, 79-1, 86-7, 84-16, 87-7, 82-3, 85-7, 85-66, 86-1, 
89-14, 78-6, 81-20, 83-14  
 
1991-1992 
87-1, 84-3, 85-13, 84-1, 85-1, 84-5, 86-1, 86-27, 89-1, 84-11, 83-14,  
78-6, 87-5, 84-16, 85-7, 91-1, 82-3, 81-20, 89-14 
 
1992-1993 




87-1, 92-1, 84-1, 85-13,  85-1, 84-5, 87-5, 89-17, 90-1, 84-16, 92-2, 84-11, 87-10, 93-1 
 
1994-1995 
87-1, 84-1, 92-1, 85-13, 84-5, 85-1, 87-5, 89-26, 84-16, 92-2, 84-3,  
89-17, 93-1, 83-14, 90-1, 91-4, 89-16, 93-3 
 
1995-1996 
87-1, 84-1, 84-3, 85-13, 84-5, 92-1, 92-2, 94-3, 93-1, 89-17, 93-3, 85-1, 87-1, 91-1, 83-
14, 84-16  
 
1996-1997 
85-13, 92-1, 84-5, 84-3, 94-3, 93-1, 88-53, 84-1, 85-1, 87-7, 93-8, 90-2, 87-5, 92-2, 92-
24, 84-16, 92-6, 91-4 
 
1997-1998 
85-13, 92-1, 97-1, 87-1, 95-5, 93-1, 84-3, 92-6, 94-3, 84-1, 84-5, 85-1, 90-2, 88-19, 91-
4, 86-24, 92-2 
 
1998-1999 
92-1, 85-13, 93-1, 97-1, 94-2, 92-2, 95-5, 84-5, 95-2, 84-1, 90-2, 94-3, 89-17, 87-1, 96-
3, 92-6, 89-26, 91-4 
 
1999-2000 




92-1, 93-1, 95-5, 97-1, 96-13, 97-9, 85-13, 95-2, 98-9, 98-5, 99-9, 90-2, 96-6, 99-1, 96-
3, 94-2, 96-1, 96-5, 95-4, 98-10, 82-18, 99-2 
 
2001-2002 
97-1, 92-1, 95-5, 93-1, 98-9, 97-9, 99-1, 90-2, 98-10, 96-13, 85-13, 99-8, 99-9, 96-3, 
96-Undrafted, 96-17, 94-2, 96-1, 96-6 
 
2002-2003 
95-5, 97-1, 92-1, 97-9, 96-13, 98-9, 93-1, 99-1, 99-9, 96-17, 98-10, 96-9, 94-2, 85-13, 
01-3, 96-3, 99-2, 90-2 
 
2003-2004 
95-5, 97-1, 99-1, 92-1, 98-9, 97-9, 96-14, 99-undrafted, 96-13, 99-9, 
 02-35, 99-24, 96-17, 01-19, 96-5, 93-24, 02-1   11





Player Name, Draft Year, and Draft Number 
 
1987-1988 
Michael Jordan: 84-3,  Larry Bird: 78-6,   Charles Barkley: 84-5,   
Hakeem Olajuwon: 84-1, Clyde Drexler: 83-14 
 
1988-1989 
Michael Jordan: 84-3,  Magic Johnson: 79-1, Charles Barkley: 84-5, 
Hakeem Olajuwon: 84-1, Karl Malone: 85-13 
 
1989-1990 
Michael Jordan: 84-3,  Hakeem Olajuwon:84-1, Patrick Ewing: 85-1,  
Karl Malone: 85-13,  Charles Barkley: 84-5 
 
1990-1991 
David Robinson: 87-1,  Michael Jordan: 84-3,  Karl Malone: 85-13,  
Charles Barkley: 84-5,  Hakeem Olajuwon: 84-1 
 
1991-1992 
David Robinson:87-1,  Michael Jordan: 84-3,  Karl Malone: 85-13,  
Hakeem Olajuwon: 84-1,  Patrick Ewing: 85-1 
 
1992-1993 
Hakeem Olajuwon 84-1,  Charles Barkley: 84-5,  Michael Jordan: 84-3,  
Karl Malone: 85-13,  David Robinson: 87-1 
 
1993-1994 
David Robinson: 87-1, Shaquille O’Neal: 92-1,  Hakeem Olajuwon: 84-
1,  Karl Malone: 85-13,   Patrick Ewing: 85-1 
 
1994-1995 
David Robinson:87-1,  Hakeem Olajuwon: 84-1,  Shaquille O’Neal: 92-
1,  Karl Malone: 85-13,  Charles Barkley: 84-5 
 
1995-1996 
David Robinson: 87-1,  Hakeem Olajuwon: 84-1,  Michael Jordan 84-3,  
Karl Malone: 85-13,  Charles Barkley: 84-5  
 
1996-1997 
Karl Malone: 85-13,  Shaquille O’Neal: 92-1,  Charles Barkley: 84-5,  
Michael Jordan: 84-3, Grant Hill: 94-3 
 
1997-1998 
Karl Malone: 85-13,  Shaquille O’Neal: 92-1, Tim Duncan: 97-1,  
David Robinson: 87-1, Kevin Garnett: 95-5 
 
1998-1999 
Shaquille O’Neal: 92-1,  Karl Malone: 85-13, Chris Webber: 93-1,  
Tim Duncan: 97-1, Jason Kidd: 94-2 
 
1999-2000 
Shaquille O’Neal: 92-1,  Kevin Garnett: 95-5,  Chris Webber: 93-1,  
Tim Duncan: 97-1,  Karl Malone: 85-13 
 
2000-2001 
Shaquille O’Neal: 92-1,  Chris Webber: 93-1,  Kevin Garnett: 95-5, 
Tim Duncan: 97-1,  Kobe Bryant: 96-13 
 
2001-2002 
Tim Duncan: 97-1,  Shaquille O’Neal: 92-1,  Kevin Garnett: 95-5,  
Chris Webber: 93-1, Dirk Nowitzski: 98-9 
 
2002-2003 
Kevin Garnett: 95-5,  Tim Duncan: 97-1,  Shaquille O’Neal: 92-1,  
Tacy McGrady: 97-9,  Kobe Bryant: 96-13 
 
2003-2004 
Kevin Garnett: 95-5,  Tim Duncan: 97-1, Elton Brand: 99-1,  
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Table 4:Mean and Standard Deviation by Draft Number: (1987-2003) 
Draft Number  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Obs.(N/n) 
1  19.47 7.84  1.67 34.41  213/26 
2  15.07 5.55  1.89 26.33  184/22 
3 15.75  6.68  .67  36.99  188/24 
4  13.79 5.17  1.95 23.80  182/20 
5  14.44 7.14  1.08 33.13  199/24 
6 10.92  6.26  .75  34.01  157/23 
7  12.59  6.00 1.09 29.2  177/25 
8 11.83  5.89  -.52  26.1  177/24 
9  12.30  6.54 .14 28.8  193/23 
10 12.11  5.45  2.36  27  156/21 
11  11.47 5.68  1.19 27.48  191/22 
12  9.36 5.06 1.33  23.44  148/23 
13 12.11  7.59  -.67  31.88  167/21 
14 10.58  6.90 -1  28.87  142/22 
15 8.86  4.60  -.4  20.06  119/18 
16 9.54  6.21  -.25  27.40  146/22 
17  9.46 6.05  .67 24.73  112/19 
18 10.07  5.22  .43  21.67  139/21 
19 8.70  5.83  -.33  22.05  116/20 
20 9.17  5.55  0  24.51  117/23 
21  8.14 5.19  .33 22.08  127/19 
22  7.94 5.38  .33 19.89  99/21 
23  8.86  4.80 .2 21.7  118/20 
24 10.26  6.02 -2  22.87  128/19 
25 7.18  5.53  -1  23.06  79/18 
26 7.83  6.27  .2  24.45  76/16 
 
   14
Table 5: Percentage of Players  who become superstars by draft pick number 
Draft Pick  Percentage with at Least One 
Superstar Season 
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Z-statistics are in parentheses below the coefficients. 
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